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Liability Cure-All for Insidious Disease Claims
Recent decisions handed down in various circuits have created virtual
chaos in predicting the liability and damage amounts of insidious disease
claims. At least three substantially divergent theories have been adopted
to impute liability to the manufacturers of the disease catalysts. Addition-
ally, a new trust fund concept has been used on a limited basis to reconcile
differences in court decisions. The trust fund approach is relatively flex-
ible and simple to apply in apportioning damages for insidious disease
claims. The author examines and analyzes these three liability theories.
In conclusion, the adoption of the trust fund concept is recommended.
I. INTRODUCTION
The insurance industry has a passion for predictability. Insur-
ance companies spend millions of dollars each year on personnel
and technical equipment to make financial and statistical predic-
tions.1 They want to know how long a person will live, which oc-
cupations are the most hazardous, and what diseases are the
most prevalent.2 Knowledge of the insured risks gives them the
ability to set premiums so as to assure themselves a comfortable
profit margin.3 The trend toward predictability and security for
insurers, however, has suffered a dramatic setback with the insur-
gence of insidious disease claims.4
Insidious diseases are those which develop gradually or in a
subtle manner with few or no symptoms to indicate their develop-
ment.5 Due to their unpredictability, insurance company statis-
tics are riot capable of computing the occurrence of these diseases
or the amount which must be paid out of the claims. This inabil-
ity to predict has left insurers floundering in a sea of financial
insecurity.
A prime example of the kind of insidious disease claims which
have caused extreme pain and suffering to the insurance commu-
1. J. ATHEARN, RISK AND INSURANCE 45 (2d. ed. 1969).
2. JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE 49 (March 1981).
3. Overall, insurance companies set premiums with an expectation of paying
out only 60% of the premiums in settlement of liability claims. ECONOMIC ALMA-
NAC 1981-82 BUSINESS FAcTBOOK 248 (1982).
4. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABuU'rY. U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY (1979).
5. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 714 (Lawyer's ed. 1982). Insidious is de-
fined as "denoting a disease that progresses with few or no symptoms to indicate
its gravity." Id.
nity are the asbestos cases, which continue to increase both nu-
merically and monetarily. An estimated 30,000 tort claims against
asbestos manufacturers were filed in state courts as of mid-sum-
mer of 1982, and the number of new filings is increasing at the
rate of 400 per month.6 Former Health Education and Welfare
Secretary Joseph Califano estimated that between eight and
eleven million persons-and potential litigants-have been ex-
posed to disease-related levels of asbestos since World War II
with 1.6 million remaining exposed to such dangers as of 1982.8 A
widely accepted study projects that from 1965 to 2000, there will
be an average of 20,000 asbestos-related deaths each year in the
United States.9
The cost of total payments of damages for asbestos exposure
from 1977 to 1995 has been placed in the range of $9.5 to $26 bil-
lion.'0 This tremendous potential liability in the asbestos cases
alone has pitted insurance companies against industry in a battle
to determine who must pick up the tab. The fighting is vigorous
as a loss for either side could spell financial ruin for the respec-
tive industry.
The courts have offered little hope of resolving the dispute.
Three divergent liability theories have arisen from divided opin-
ions among the circuits. One theory imposes liability on the em-
ployer and insurer from the time the claimant is first exposed to
the dangerous substance." A second theory propounds that lia-
bility is not triggered until the time of disease manifestation or
medical discovery.' 2 A third notion imposes liability on all insur-
ers from the date of initial injury to final manifestation without
regard to any time factors.13
Currently, with the three approaches to liability simultaneously
in effect, there is chaos in predicting whether the insurer will be
6. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1982, § 1 at 1, col. 1. See also Legal Times of Washing-
ton, Oct. 12, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
7. BEST INSURANCE MANAGEMENT REPORTS, RELEASE 7 (1980).
8. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, NATIONAL OC-
CUPATIONAL HAZARD SURVEY: SURVEY ANALYSIS AND SUPPLEMENT TABLES (Dec.
1982).
9. J. SELIKOFF, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HEAT AND FROST INSULATORS
AND ASBESTOS WORKERS REPORT (Sept. 1967).
10. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR REPORT, Compilation of State Compensation Awards
in Asbestos Claims (1981).
11. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1982); see also infra notes 80-86 and
accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (ist
Cir. 1982); see also infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); see also infra notes ].00-116 and accompa-
nying text.
126
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liable for the claims as of the time of: (1) exposure, (2) manifesta-
tion, or (3) the entire injury period. In addition to this confusion,
during certain periods industry either could not, or chose not to,
obtain any insurance against insidious disease claims, therefore
leaving the manufacturer partially liable for damages.14 Since the
1930's, due to the increasing awareness of the high risks involved,
most insurance companies issued only single year policies with
extraordinarily high deductibles.5 Since 1978, virtually all insur-
ers have excluded industrial disease coverage from their liability
policies.16 Thus, final resolution as to which liability theory ap-
plies is of the utmost importance in determining who will be re-
sponsible for the tremendous amounts owing on these -insidious
disease claims.
In proposing a solution to this dilemma, several factors must be
taken into consideration. First, an examination is required of the
insurance contract's terms, as well as the insurance company's
claim policies. Second, the three liability theories of manifesta-
tion, exposure, and the continuous trigger, with an emphasis on
their relative advantages and weaknesses will be reviewed. Fi-
nally, the reasoning behind a suggested uniform standard of de-
termining liability, and the use of a trust fund approach to resolve
the insidious disease claims dispute will be discussed.
14. The first known medical report linking industrial hazardous substances to
the later development of disease was issued in Britain. Cooke, Fibrosis of the
Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Industrial Dust, II BRIT. MED. J., 147 (1924). The
first report of medical evidence issued in the United States studied the industries
of asbestos, shipbuilding, and insulation. The study was released in 1935, with
even greater proof of industrial hazards to health than its earlier British counter-
part. Lynch and Smith, Carcinoma of the Lung, 24 Am. J. CANCER 56 (1935).
15. Industries engaged in the manufacture or handling of disease-related sub-
stances frequently changed insurers in order to take advantage of cheaper rates,
and on the average had policies issued by nine different insurance companies dur-
ing the period of 1940-1978. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS
ON OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES (June 1980).
16. During the years of World War 11, liability insurance was extremely expen-
sive, due to the number of women working in manufacturing plants. Because of
this, industry often opted not to insure itself. Also, because of wartime exigencies,
manufacturers were more willing to experiment with substances which had not
been tested for worker safety. Thus, workers were exposed to disease-related
materials by manufacturers who did not have any corresponding insurance. DEPt
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INDUSTRIAL ExPO-
SURE TO HAZARDOUS MATERLiS AND LIABILITY OF THE MANUFACTURER (April 1979).
II. THE BASIC CAUSES OF THE LiABiLITY DISPUTE
Several basic factors must be examined to appreciate the split
of authority. The very nature of the development of insidious dis-
eases sheds light on the aspect of medical unpredictability as to
how and when the disease develops. Furthermore, recent
changes in insurance liability policies, permit different judicial in-
terpretations. Finally, modern legal attitudes and strategies have
modified claim settling procedures. These basic underlying
causes must be considered as a foundation to understanding the
divergence of liability theories.
A. The Development of Insidious Diseases
Perhaps the very nature of an insidious disease is the most im-
portant cause in the current confusion. By definition, an insidious
disease is an injury which results from exposure to hazardous
materials, but develops within the body without; serious conse-
quences for years until a final period where permanent physical
symptoms appear, usually resulting in death. Some common ex-
amples of insidious diseases include: black lung in coal miners;17
asbestos fiber inhalation;18 Agent Orange poisonings;19 and DES
cases.
20
Neither the medical profession nor the various industries agree
17. Black lung is caused by the inhalation of coal dust particles by miners. It
results in pheumoconiosis (a scarring and blockage of the lung airways due to the
dust buildup). Although the disease causes serious respiratory problems, medical
detection through chest x-rays is not usually possible until there is almost com-
plete blockage of the lungs. See 3 EPLER, EVALUATION OF PULMONARY DISABmIrrY,
CLINICAL CHALLENGE IN CARDIO-PULMONARY MEDICINE #2, American College of
Chest Physicians (1980), and Morgan, W.K.C., Respiratory Disability in Coal Min-
ers, 243 J. Am. MED. ASS'N 2401-04 (1980).
18. Inhalation of asbestos fibers has been cited as the cause of pheumoconi-
osis (lung scarring and eventual airway blockage), pleural abnormalities (harden-
ing or thickening of the chest cavity which restricts breathing), and pulmonary
carcinoma (lung cancer). All diseases are capable of medical detection over a pe-
riod of years as the symptoms develop, however, rarely are any cases diagnosed
within 10 years after exposure to asbestos. See Asbestos Exposure and Neoplasia,
188 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 22 (1964), and 1 MICHAELS, ASBESTOS PROPERTIES APPLICA-
TIONS AND HAZARDS (1979).
19. Agent Orange was used as a defoliating herbicide during the Vietnam War,
but contains dioxin (a deadly poison) which has resulted in nervous system dam-
age to veterans and birth defects in their children. The dosages were supposedly
safe for humans. See Medical World News, Feb. 16, 1981, at 45, and "Agent Orange"
Product Liability Litigation, 7 AM. J. OF L. & MED. 46 (1981).
20. DES is a synthetic estrogen which was given to women in the 1940's
through the 1970's to prevent miscarriages. The ingestion of DES had no apparent
side effects for the women. Their daughters, however, are now suffering from cer-
vical cancer and reproductive changes which either prevent pregnancy or result in
miscarriages or deformed children. See Product Quality and Safety Manufacturers
Liability-DES, 7 AM. J. OF L. & MED. 213 (1981), and Eclavea, Diethrylstilbestrol
(DES), 2 AM. L. REP. 1091 (4th ed. 1980).
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on how exposure to the substances can cause an insidious dis-
ease. Governmental agencies, relying on their own statistics, also
disagree as to what constitutes safe or hazardous exposure limits.
The asbestos guidelines promulgated by three of those agencies,
OSHA, EPA, and CPSC, recommend conflicting exposure limits,
resulting in industry-wide speculation as to the true danger
level.21
Further clouding over the amount of exposure which may trig-
ger development of the disease demands consideration of other
factors such as work time, surroundings, and even the climate
where the exposure occurs.22 The exposure time itself is impor-
tant in calculating the risk of injury,23 as exposure amount and
time indicates the possibility of future disease. The unpredictable
nature of the amounts and times of exposure, however, limits the
usefulness of these indices to the courts or medical profession in
attempting to impose liability for insidious diseases.
Following the initial exposure, assuming that it was of an
amount sufficient to cause injury, the disease does not manifest
itself for many years. The latency period, where the disease pro-
gresses, but shows no real outward symptoms, is subject to great
variances. "In many instances, diseases now being seen are the
result of conditions in the 1920's, 1930's and 1940's .... By the
same token, exposures today will be reflected by disease in the
year 2000. . ."24 The latency period is estimated to range from
three to more than fifty years, depending on the type of disease
21. The Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) has determined
that exposure to 5 fibers per cc longer than 5 microns is unsafe. 45 Fed. Reg. 77,
840 (1980), (OSHA). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims expo-
sure to 2 fibers per cc longer than 5 microns may cause disease-related injury. 45
Fed. Reg. 77, 868 (1980), (EPA). Finally, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion (CPSC) has declared that 3 fibers per cc shorter than 5 microns will be con-
sidered a hazardous exposure. 45 Fed. Reg. 77, 883 (1980), (CPSC).
22. Dust in the workplace, hourly shifts of workers exposed, and humidity or
dryness of the climate have all been cited as conditions which may either increase
or decrease the amount of exposure necessary to trigger insidious diseases. See
SELIKOFF & LEE, ASBESTOS AND DISEASE (1978).
23. Depending on the substance, exposure time may be very brief, as in the
case of drugs injected into the body. See Thrift v. Tenneco Chem., Inc., 381 F.
Supp. 543, 544 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (only a few minutes elapsed between the injection
and adverse reaction). On the other hand, exposure in the case of industrial work-
ers may continue for ten years or more. See Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 883, 159 Cal. Rptr. 113, 114 (1979) (over 30 years passed
between the initial exposure and medical discovery of asbestiosis).
24. Selikoff, Widening Perspectives of Occupational Disease, 2 PREVENTIVE
MED. 412, 430-31 (1973).
and amount of exposure involved. Typically, the disease will
manifest itself within 10 to 25 years following exposure.25 Mani-
festation of symptoms is usually considered the best method of
detecting insidious diseases because medical diagnosis of insidi-
ous disease is a relatively new concept.
Medical detection of insidious diseases is at best difficult, be-
cause they often "cause very little inconvenience and may pass
unnoticed until the development of some other symptoms directs
attention to the person's general state of health."26 The medical
profession is generally untrained in the detection and diagnosis of
these types of diseases and frequently relies on the presence of
other symptoms to indicate the need for further testing27 with the
result that the presence of insidious disease is not conclusively
detected until it has advanced to stages of severely deteriorated
health.28 Current diagnostic techniques, including chest x-rays or
blood tests, may have to be performed so frequently as to result
in increased potential danger to the individual. Furthermore, the
general health of the person, such as weight, blood pressure, and
lung capacity, may produce ambiguities in the test results and
eventual diagnosis. 29
The medical profession is unable to accurately pinpoint how
much exposure was received and how the disease developed. The
inability to determine exposure and manifestation times makes it
difficult for courts to impose liability for these disease claims. In
turn, insurers cannot predict with any certainty their financial
burden for premium and claim settlement purposes. The medical
profession and technology, however, cannot take the entire blame
because the insurance industry's general liability policies have
undergone modifications of their own in recent years, making res-
olution of the issue of liability even more difficult.
B. Insurance Policy Construction and Settlement Practices
Insurance enables a buyer to finance a risk for a set price.
25. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBUC HEALTH SERVICE
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL REPORT (June 1977).
26. Birnbaum, "First Breath's" Last Gasp: The Discovery Rule in Products Li-
ability Cases, 13 FORUM 279 (1977).
27. A review of medical schools revealed that of the 119 American Medical As-
sociation-accredited schools, only 21 schools offer any curriculum in occupational
or long-term illnesses, with most courses subject to cancellation for sparse enroll-
ment. SURVEY OF BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD, DEP'T OF LABOR MEDICAL REPORT
(1979). See also THE AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION, LUNG DISEASES, AN INTRODUC-
TION (1979).
28. See MANAGEMENT OF ASSUMED RISKS FOR CARCINOGENS, NEW YORK ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES REPORT (1981).
29. Id.
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Through insurance, the risk is transferred from the insured to the
insurer for a premium. The insurer, a professional risk-bearer,
expects the premium to cover losses and expenses so that the
company may show a satisfactory profit for its risk assumption.30
With minor variations, the standard comprehensive general liabil-
ity insurance policies issued to industries and manufacturers are
of a uniform type, and state:
The company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages as the policy applies,
caused by an occurrence, and the insurance company will have the right
and duty to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on ac-
count of such bodily injury .... 31
Historically, insurance companies have flourished as a result of
these highly profitable industrial liability policies. 32 This lucrative
business, however, crashed in the mid-1970's with the deluge of
claims filed by persons suffering from a multitude of insidious dis-
eases. There are presently more than 200 substances which have
been identified under the Occupational Health and Safety Act
(OSHA) as disease or cancer-causing agents; each one providing
a basis for insurance liability.33
Prior to 1966, general liability policies issued by insurance com-
panies provided coverage only for "accidental" injuries. This lan-
guage implied that the policy covered only "injuries and damage
caused by events that were unintended, unexpected and sudden
and therefore identifiable in time and place."34 The courts, how-
ever, began to interpret the term "accident" more broadly, refus-
ing to limit coverage to sudden events, and extending it to injuries
and property damage that were progressive or gradual.35
30. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABnrY, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY (1979).
31. Standard comprehensive general liability insurance policy language was
drafted under the auspices of various insurance industry associations, including
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, the Mutual Insurance Rating Bu-
reau and, since 1972, the Insurance Services Office.
32. Annual total profits of all liability insurers rose dramatically from $11 mil-
lion in 1960 to over $50 million in 1974. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSUR-
ANCE FACTS (1981).
33. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES (June 1981).
34. OBRIST, THE NEW COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY-
A COVERAGE ANALYSIS 16 (1966).
35. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 281 F.2d
538 (3d Cir. 1960) (where the court held that the gradual peeling of paint over a
two-year period was property damage within the meaning of insurance policy);
Geddes & Smith, Inc. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemn. Co., 51 Cal. 2d 558, 334 P.2d 881
In 1966, the general liability insurance policy underwent
changes in standardization and text that remain in effect today.3 6
The major change in wording in the liability policy was the substi-
tution of the use of "occurrence" for "accident" in bodily injury
coverage. "Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, including inju-
rious exposure to conditions, which results, during the policy pe-
riod, in bodily injury.... ."37 The intent behind the policy
revision was:
Although it is most common that the injury takes place simultaneously
with the exposure, there are many instances of injuries taking place over
an extended period of time before they become evident. For example,
slow ingestion of foreign substances or inhalation of noxious fumes. In
cases such as these, the definition of occurrence serves to identify the
time of loss for the purpose of applying coverage-the injury must take
place during the policy period.
3 8
Thus, the significance of the policy language change was a rec-
ognition by the insurance industry of the problem of insidious
diseases and their gradual development. It also signaled the ap-
parent consensus by insurers that injury would have to occur
before liability would be triggered. Once the injury was discov-
ered, however, the insurer would be liable for all claims occurring
within the policy period.39 The new wording of the general liabil-
ity policy, which appeared to clear the doubts concerning insidi-
ous disease claims, only served to further obscure the issue.
The practice of insurance companies in settling and paying in-
sidious disease claims added to the wording problems. As previ-
ously mentioned, the business of liability insurance developed
from a type of coverage and pricing game where most insurers
only issued annual policies. 40 Many of the industries now being
sued for insidious injury damages employed a succession of in-
(1959) (where the court awarded damages for both property damage and injury
due to defectively built doors warping and jamming over a three year period).
36. The work of revision was instituted in 1959 by the National Bureau of Cas-
ualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau to provide uniform
coverage policies. See supra note 34. However, Judge Keith noted in Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1226 n.29 (6th Cir. 1980)
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1109 (1982), that "the cause of the plague (of cases resulting
from unsatisfactory resolutions); however, is an insurance industry which adopted
a standard policy which is inadequate to deal with the problems of asbestosis."
Id,
37. The Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy definitions were
promulgated by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual In-
surance Rating Bureau and adopted by all liability insurance companies of the
United States.
38. Elliott, The New Policy Provisionsfor General Liability Insurance, 18 THE
ArNALs 3, 197 (Fall 1965) (Elliott is the Secretary of the National Bureau of Casu-
alty Underwriters). See also LONG, LAw OF LIABarY INSURANCE § 11.05A (1973).
39. See Roscow and Liederman, An Overview to the Interpretive Problems of
"Occurrence" in Comprehensive Liability Insurance, 16 FORUM 1148 (1981).
40. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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surers, which confuses the determination of both liability and ap-
portionment for each insurer.41 Also, prior to the insurance
companies' knowledge of the extent and number of claims to be
filed, they were often cooperative with the manufacturer or other
insurance companies by settling for a pro-rata share of the dam-
ages. This practice was often used to avoid litigation and expedite
the payment of claims to injured parties. However, with the cur-
rent financial stakes and the tremendous number of claims filed,
insurance companies have refused to split costs-and thus must
litigate the issue of liability for the amount due to the injured in-
dividual.42 Additionally, the court system itself is changing its at-
titude toward insidious disease claims and the imposition of
liability.
C. Changes in Legal Attitudes
In building the great pyramid of confusion in attempting to re-
solve insidious disease litigation, it has been noted that there are
several conflicts between medical evidence and insurance prac-
tices. Recent modifications of legal attitudes toward insidious dis-
ease claims, such as the discovery statute of limitations and the
imposition of joint and several liability, add to the current
disorganization.
Due to the lengthy latency period which characterizes insidious
diseases, 43 injured plaintiffs have been barred from asserting a
claim because the applicable statute of limitations had run by the
time they became aware of their illness and the causal link to the
manufacturer's product." 'The statutory period of limitations [in
some courts] begins to run from the time when liability for wrong
41. Successive insurers cover both the primary insurers of an industry, along
with excessive insurers or reinsurers that provide the company with additional
layers of coverage. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABILrrY, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE INSURANCE STUDY 1-16 to 1-18 (1977).
42. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1109 (1982), where the Insurance Com-
pany of North America refused to accept full liability for damages as it was only
one of five insurers covering the Forty-Eight Insulation manufacturers. The court
ultimately pro-rated liability among the five.
43. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E.
824 (1936), where the plaintifTs lung disease was found to be a result of an accu-
mulative inhalation of dust during his employment. The disease did not appear
for many years and the New York Court of Appeals held the action was time-
barred.
has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the
existence of the wrong or injury."45
To overcome the undue harshness and burden on the claimant
due to the statute of limitations bar, the United States Supreme
Court, in Urie v. Thompson,46 announced the application of a dis-
covery rule. The Urie Court disregarded the three year statute of
limitations to permit a claim for disintegration of the lungs caused
by occupational silica dust exposure which did not manifest itself
for thirty years.47 The Court noted that enforcement of the stat-
ute of limitations would have been a delusive remedy, as it would
charge Urie with the unknown and inherently unknowable aware-
ness of his disease.48 The Court held that for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations, a plaintiff would not be decreed injured until
the disease manifested itself in some medically recognizable
form. 49
Several tremors have also been detected in the judicial ground-
work over the imposition of liability.50 The insurance industry
felt the first shocks of a virtual legal earthquake in Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.S' The court decided in Borel
that conditions contributing to diseases are basically indivisible,
and the amount of injury at any one time is likewise indetermin-
able. 52 Since the bodily injury could not be precisely determined,
the court in Borel held all manufacturers and distributors of the
product jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of dam-
ages. 53 This early asbestos case sent out repercussions to insur-
ers that they could be liable for phenomenally high damages as a
result of their manufacturer's liability policy.
. These judicial decisions, coupled with problems in proving ex-
posure and manifestation,5 4 along with previous insurance prac-
tices, 55 did not financially benefit the insurance industry. As a
result, the'insurers themselves were forced to employ new strate-
45. Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d
920 (1979) (citing Schmidt v. Merchants Dispatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200
N.E. 824 (1936)).
46. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
47. Id. at 166-67.
48. Id. at 169-70.
49. Id. at 170-71.
50. See, e.g., Comment, Insurance Law-Products Liability Insurance-Time
of Exposure Triggers Coverage for Asbestos-Related Diseases, 26 WAYNE L REV.
1127 (1980) (sets forth various court interpretations in non-enforcement of the
statute of limitations in manifestation cases).
51. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
52. Id. at 1083-85, 1094.
53. Id. at 1094. See also Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155
(8th Cir. 1975).
54. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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gies to avoid liability. These tactics were successful in some
courts, but not in others, and explain in part the judicial diver-
gence of liability theories. The theories include exposure, mani-
festation, and in-residence approaches to imposing liability. Each
theory is distinct from the other, but together they could spell dis-
aster for the insurance! industry, as well as causing great financial
unpredictability to liability insurers attempting to settle insidious
disease claims.
III. THE CONFUCTING THEORIES OF LLABiixry
The development of the three liability theories was a result of
the different avoidance practices of insurance companies in vari-
ous circuits. All the courts agree that once coverage is triggered
by an occurrence of bodily injury due to disease, the insurer can-
not refuse coverage.5 6 The word "occurrence," however, is the
key and all three liability theories are a direct result of the vari-
ous interpretations given that word.5 7 The exposure theory trig-
gers liability upon the initial exposure to the dangerous
substance.5 8 The manifestation theory states that there is no lia-
bility until the disease becomes manifest or at least capable of
medical detection.5 9 Finally, the most recently developed in-resi-
dence theory imputes liability on all the insurers from the time of
initial exposure to final manifestation. 60
All three theories have been accepted by various circuits, al-
though some circuits are still undecided on which liability stan-
dard to adopt. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not granted
certiorari to resolve this question. The result is that insurers are
confused and thwarted in their attempts to prepare a defense be-
56. THE NEW STANDARD COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE POL-
ICY, ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW PROCEED-
INGS 250 (1966).
57. See generally Roscow and Liederman, supra note 39, at 1151-52.
58. See supra note 50.
59. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 23-25 (1st Cir.
1982). The Eagle-Picher court distinguished the case of Keene Corp. v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 10,14 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1007 (1982), de-
cided by the same circuit only a year earlier, on the grounds that the Keene court
construed the insurance policies in order to fulfill the reasonable expectations of
the parties, which resulted in full liability. However, the parties involved in the
Eagle-Picher litigation were not interpreted to have similar expectations; thus, the
more limited liability was applied. 682 F.2d at 23.
60. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (lst Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
cause they do not know what theory might be applied. Insurers,
in those circuits that are undecided, are waiting to make claim
payments, and intentionally subjecting themselves to further law
suits for bad faith. Each legal theory has its own advantages and
weaknesses which must be examined to determine if any one ap-
pears to be the best resolution of the liability confusion. Asbestos
cases are particularly illustrative, because they are the most re-
cent and well-defined in terms of the current liability controversy.
The decisions discussed herein, however, may be applied to all
types of insidious disease claims.6 1
A. The Disease Manifestation Theory
The manifestation approach is heavily favored by insurance
companies. Its theorists contend that liability does not arise until
the condition became or should have become known to the plain-
tiff, or the date on which the plaintiffs condition was medically di-
agnosed, whichever occurs first.62 The manifestation theory is a
court-adopted theory for allocating insurer liability. In its applica-
tion, a court construes the term "bodily injury" in the comprehen-
sive general liability policy to include only the bodily injury
caused by an occurrence that manifests itself during the policy
period.63 Consequently, under the manifestation approach, only
the insurance carrier providing coverage at the time the plaintiffs
injury or disease became manifest is liable to indemnify the
manufacturer.64
The leading decision adopting the manifestation theory is Ea-
gle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins-urance Co.65 In
Eagle-Picher, the manufacturer successfully argued that Liberty
Mutual and other insurer defendants should indemnify Eagle-
Picher for asbestos claims filed between 1968 and 1979. The de-
fendants countered that they should not be liable for such claims
as the manufacturer, who carried no insurance for disease claims
arising prior to 1968, was attempting to shift its liability to them.66
The court imposed liability on the defendants, relying on medical
evidence which demonstrated that exposure to asbestos fibers
and physical injury did not occur simultaneously. 67 Thus, the
61. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
62. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1216-
17 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
63. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 23-25 (1st Cir.
1982).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 15-16.
66. Id. at 16-17.
67. Id. at 18. See also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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court held that in order to uphold the policy language, liability
would be imposed upon the manufacturer and insurer only when
some clinical evidence or manifestation occurred.68 Further, the
court in Eagle-Picher favored the manifestation approach as a
mechanism to provide coverage for the manufacturer who was un-
insured during the exposure period of most employees who filed
claims. 69
The manifestation theory adopted in Eagle-Picher has generally
been applauded by a significant portion of the insurance industry.
This position is favored because, unlike Liberty Mutual and its co-
defendants, most insurers provided coverage for the manufac-
turer in the earlier years when the exposure to hazardous sub-
stances actually took place. And, as previously mentioned, most
insurers refused to issue these liability policies after 197870 when
the asbestos scare began to receive publicity.
The manifestation approach is a judicially sound theory which
parallels other insurance liability decisions. First, it is compatible
with workers' compensation cases, holding that the last insurer of
the last employer bears the full loss, even for progressive condi-
tions that take many years to manifest themselves. 71 Second,
health and accident cases are in agreement that bodily injury
does not originate, for purposes of liability, until it reveals itself.7 2
Finally, the manifestation approach recognizes that some type of
manifestation or discovery of the disease is necessary to set in
motion the statute of limitations.7 3
Although the manifestation approach is appealing to most in-
surers and is judicially compatible with other insurance liability
cases, it contains serious pitfalls. First, manifestation theorists
themselves are sharply divided as to what manifestation means.
For example, some construe manifestation to mean the time of di-
agnosis; others believe it to imply the time when a claimant knew
68. 682 F.2d at 18.
69. Id. at 17. See also Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
70. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
71. General Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review Bds., 565 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.
1977); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Cardillo, 225 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913
(1955).
72. Reiser v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 262 A.D. 171, 28 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1941),
affd, 289 N.Y. 561 (1942).
73. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
or should have known of the presence of the injury or disease;
and another group suggests it to mean the date on which the poli-
cyholder manufacturer became aware of the possible future
claim.7 4
Another problem relates to the type of medical evidence neces-
sary to establish manifestation, where it is unclear if discovery of
the disease means a positive x-ray result or merely a cough or
shortness of breath by the claimant. 75 In Eagle-Picker, the court
used the manifestation theory to impose liability on the insurer,
rather than the manufacturer who was uninsured during expo-
sure periods.76 This approach afforded relief to Eagle-Picher, but
could seriously harm the insurance industry if adopted by other
courts. The manifestation theory offers a more precise and arbi-
trary method for insurers to predict liability. Its flaws, however,
could backfire and result in greater liability than insurers may
have anticipated.
B. The Injurious Exposure Theory
The exposure theory of liability is the approach favored by
manufacturers. Exposure proponents contend that liability is
triggered from the date the person was initially exposed to the
dangerous substance. 77 The courts who adopt the injurious expo-
sure theory deem bodily injury to have legally occurred upon the
first exposure to the hazard.78 Therefore, the insurance company
whose policy was in effect at the time the plaintiff was exposed is
responsible as an indemnitor, even if it no longer covers the in-
sured manufacturer when the suit is brought.79
The landmark decision imposing liability on the insurance com-
pany based on the injurious exposure theory was Insurance Com-
pany of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 80 The case
involved a declaratory judgment action filed by the insurance
74. See Insurance Coverage for Asbestos Tort Litigation, J. OF PROD. LIAB. 69,
72 (1982).
75. This question was not resolved in Eagle-Picher; the court implied that
manifestation could involve a number of symptoms or medical testing results. 682
F.2d at 24-25.
76. Id. at 17. It was noted that if uncertainties existed in the policy, the court
would consider the extrinsic evidence in a manner most unfavorable to the insurer
and impose liability coverage.
77. See generally Reeves, The Carcinogenic Effect of Inhaled Asbestos Fibers, 6
AN'AL. Cun. & LAB. Sci. 459 (1976).
78. Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1109 (1981).
79. Id.
80. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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company to determine its liability to an asbestos manufacturer.81
The manufacturer, Forty-Eight, had held products liability poli-
cies from five different insurance companies. Thus, the issue
before the court was which of the insurers was obligated to pro-
vide indemnification for potential liability.82
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found bodily injury to have
legally occurred shortly after the initial inhalation of asbestos
fibers.83 Consequently, the insurer providing coverage when the
plaintiff was allegedly exposed to the hazardous condition would
be responsible as the indemnitor.84 The court also held that the
insured manufacturer itself was liable for a pro-rata share of dam-
ages for any uninsured or self-insured years.8 5 In arriving at its
decision, the court distinguished the workers' compensation
cases, and relied instead on medical evidence and public policy
favoring coverage. 86
There are several advantages to the injurious exposure theory.
The major advantage expounded in Insurance Company of North
America focused on the fact that this theory reflects the medical
evidence that injury occurs either simultaneously or soon after
the initial inhalation.8 7 When the fibers enter the respiratory
tract they are deposited and lodge in the airways and lung tissue
where they build up and cause blockage of the pulmonary func-
tions.88 Although the initial occurrence may not cause any pain to
the plaintiff or even be capable of medical detection, the court
held this was the "bodily injury" necessary to trigger liability.8 9
A further benefit resulting from the injurious exposure theory
is the avoidance of the tolling of the statute of limitations. The
statute has been reinterpreted to permit the claim even though
81. Id. at 1214.
82. Id. at 1216.
83. Id. at 1223. See also APPELMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICES § 355
(1965).
84. 633 F.2d at 1223-24.
85. Id. at 1224-25.
86. Id. at 1218-20. See aLo Tijsseling v. General Accident Fire and Life Assur-
ance Corp., Ltd., 55 Cal. App. 3d 623, 127 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1976) (where the court held
that damages could be measured and pro-rated to provide at least partial recovery
to the claimant).
87. Selikoff, Bader, Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasia, 42 AM. J.
MED. 487, 492 (1976).
88. U.S. DEP'T OF HEAL[H, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, No. 78-1681, ASBESTOS:
AN INFORMATION RESOURCE 34-35 (1978).
89. 633 F.2d at 1218.
the actual discovery or manifestation does not occur until years
later. This change upholds the public policy favoring broad avail-
ability to claimants who were unaware that they were injured
prior to the normal two year statute of limitations.90 This is simi-
lar to the law of accident insurance, where the process-of-nature
rule determines liability coverage. 91 The process-of-nature rule
provides coverage in circumstances where the resulting injury
does not become apparent until a later date because of the natu-
ral development of the condition. The Insurance Company of
North America court relied heavily on public policy favoring the
process-of-nature theory, and construed the statute of limitations
so as to impose liability on the insurers as of the exposure date.92
The decision saved many manufacturers who would have been
unable to pay all of the claims if a manifestation approach were
utilized;93 however, the exposure theory itself has many flaws.
The foremost problem with the exposure theory is defining the
word "exposure." Similar to the manifestation puzzle, different
interpretations have been given to the theoretical idea in its appli-
cation. Some interpret the word to mean that point in time when
the causative substance enters the body--or when inhalation of
asbestos fibers occurred.94 Others insist that exposure includes
not only the initial inhalation, but encompasses the entire period
of continuing injury prior to the cessation of inhalation.95 The
court in Insurance Company of North America did not delineate
between these two approaches. 96
The theory raises many questions as to insurer liability. Is the
insurer who provided coverage as of the employee's first day of
work liable, or is it every insurer whose policy was in effect while
that particular employee was subject to the hazard? Also, in most
of the cases the initial exposure occurred fifteen to thirty years
prior to the filing of the action, when employment records may
90. Id. at 1219-20.
91. Willden v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 18 Cal. 3d 631, 557 P.2d 501, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1976).
92. 633 F.2d at 1219-21.
93. Granelli, The Asbestos Case Explosion, THE NAT'L UJ., Oct. 19, 1981, at 24,
col. 3.
94. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. at 2, 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
95. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Fed. Ins. Co. and Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. at 16,
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
96. The confusion between simple exposure and exposure throughout the en-
tire period of inhalation was discussed in the trial court, 451 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D.
Mich. 1978), but the two policies were not distinguished. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed this aspect without discussion and merely considered the allo-
cation of damages. 633 F.2d at 1218-20.
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have been too sketchy to set the exact date when exposure first
occurred.9 7 Liability could not be imposed on an insurer unless it
was specifically shown that their policy was in effect on the injury
date.
A second drawback in the rationale of the exposure theory in-
volves, as does the manifestation approach, the uncertainty and
inaccuracy of medical evidence. The exact effect of substances
entering the respiratory tract is not fully understood.98 Moreover,
medical evidence does not conclusively establish that every expo-
sure to hazardous conditions will necessarily result in damage or
disease to the person.99 Therefore, the imposition of liability
under the exposure theory may lead to fraudulent claims because
presumably a manifestation of a subsequent injury would not
have to be proven in order to recover.
The manifestation and exposure theories clearly favor either in-
surers or manufacturers. Neither, however, appears to be an eq-
uitable solution for the commercial solvency of both the
insurance and manufacturing industries. A third approach to lia-
bility combines aspects of the manifestation and exposure theo-
ries to form a new judicial mechanism imposing liability for
insidious diseases.
C. In Residence or the Continuous Trigger Theory
The third alternative liability theory is the most recent one de-
veloped by the courts. The continuous trigger theory is a hybrid
of the manifestation and exposure theories. It further attempts to
refine the characteristics of both, as it takes into consideration the
fact that inhalation exposure, in residence development, and man-
ifestation of the resultant insidious disease all trigger liability
coverage.100 The continuous trigger idea adopts the view that the
bodily injury required in the policy encompasses any part of the
injurious process from the initial first breath of exposure through
outward manifestation of the physical disease. 0 1 Therefore,
every insurer who provided coverage during any period of the
97. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 88.
99. 633 F.2d at 1219.
100. Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
101. Id.
disease development will be liable to indemnify the insured
manufacturer.
The recent case of Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North
America 102 developed the continuous trigger theory as a compro-
mise between the earlier injurious exposure and manifestation
approaches. Keene Corporation was an asbestos and thermal in-
sulation manufacturer who sought declaratory judgment of the
rights and obligations of its four insurers between 1961 and
1980.103 Keene, who contended that the policies of each insurer
should cover all potential liability,104 requested a judicial determi-
nation of the extent of liability of each policy for asbestos-related
suits arising between 1948 and 1972.105 Each of the insurers
prayed for application of either the manifestation or exposure
theories.106
The court sought to resolve the matter and impose liability in
an equitable manner.10 7 The court held that liability was trig-
gered by initial exposure, and liability continues while the dis-
ease was in residence until manifestation.1 08 Once the insurance
policy was triggered by the injury, the insurer became obligated
to pay all sums for which the policyholder was liable, 0 9 but was
also permitted to seek contribution from each other insurer.110
The court absolved Keene itself from any liability, by not requir-
ing it to pay any portion of the damages, even during periods
when it was uninsured or unable to provide coverage."'
The Keene decision was a result of great emphasis being placed
on other types of insurance policies. The court rejected the stat-
ute of limitation cases 1 2 because they left claimants without a
remedy for many meritorious claims."l3 Workers' compensation
102. 667 F.2d 1034.
103. Id. at 1038.
104. Id. at 1038-39.
105. Id.
106. Aetna, INA, and Liberty Mutual argued that coverage should be triggered
using a manifestation approach so only the insurer providing coverage at the time
of discovery would be liable. Hartford took a different position contending that
even though coverage was triggered by inhalation, each company's coverage
should be limited by the ratio of its coverage years to the total years of inhalation.
667 F.2d at 1039.
107. Id. at 1041. See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d, §§ 15:22, 15:41 (2d ed.
Anderson 1959).
108. 667 F.2d at 1047.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1050. The court stressed the importance of pro-rata distribution of
liability between insurers to give full effect to the "other insurance" clauses of the
respective policies.
111. Id. at 1047.
112. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
113. 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979)).
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cases n1 4 were deemed irrelevant, because they relied on the mani-
festation theory of liabi]ity approach which the court pointed out
should not override the general rule of law that insurance con-
tracts should be construed so as to provide maximum coverage. 115
Instead, the court looked to insurance law cases in holding that
the initial injury triggers policy coverage and makes the insurer
liable for all resulting harm." 6
The Keene decision offers advantages over the other liability
theories. First, it provides a mechanism to equitably prorate the
liability of the numerous insurers who might have written insur-
ance policies during the exposure periods. 117 This arrangement is
beneficial to both the insurance industry and manufacturers
whose products cause insidious diseases. No one insurance com-
pany is saddled with tile entire burden of liability, as under the
other theories, but the arrangement does not provide indemnifica-
tion to the manufacturer in accordance with the public policy en-
couraging coverage.
Second, the evidentiary problems of the manifestation and inju-
rious exposure theories are eliminated.1 8 Using the continuous
trigger, the time between the initial exposure and the resulting
manifestation is the liability period." 9 There is no need for so-
phisticated or confusing medical testimony to prove when the dis-
ease may have arisen. The guessing game of attempting to place
or shift dates to avoid liability is eliminated. The continuous trig-
ger approach sets the coverage dates based upon simple records
of employment and medical establishment of the disease and re-
sulting death.
Although the advantages and simplicity of the Keene decision
will probably encourage its future use, there are numerous traps
in the application of the holding. First, the case may be too sim-
plistic. Imposing liability from the date of initial exposure during
employment 20 appears easier than attempting to use medical evi-
114. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
115. 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (citing General Dynamics Corp. v. Benefits Review
Bds., 565 F.2d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 1977)); 667 F.2d at 1043 (citing Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
Cardillo, 255 F.2d at 145 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 913 (1955)).
116. 667 F.2d at 1043 n.17 (citing Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 71
Wash. 2d. 178, 427 P.2d 716 (1967)).
117. 667 F.2d at 1050.
118. See, e.g., supra notes 75-76 and 94-97 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
120. Id. at 1047.
dence to establish some type of injury, however, employment
records made twenty to forty years ago may be inaccurate.
Furthermore, the current federal workers' statutes mandating re-
cordkeeping requirements had not yet been enacted. Thus, estab-
lishing the initial injury date may be virtually impossible.121
A second fault with the continuous trigger approach revolves
around calculating pro-rata liability among insurers. The average
asbestos manufacturer carried nine different liability policies be-
tween the years 1940 and 1978.122 Added to this situation are the
thousands of claims which have been filed,123 and the tremendous
amounts at stake.124 No court has really attempted to solve this
vexatious and complex issue.
Third, the Keene decision may favor manufacturers. The court
stressed the need to prorate liability among all insurers, but, at
the same time, totally exempted manufacturers from all liabil-
ity.125 Manufacturers were excluded even for years when they
chose to self-insure and did not provide coverage. 12 6 This position
imposes greater burdens on the insurers, who are then forced to
"cover" for the manufacturer and pay extra for periods previously
not provided for under any policy.
This apparent inequity was the basis for Judge Wald's partial
dissent in Keene, where he argued that if the manufacturer was
voluntarily uninsured during part of the injurious process, it
should also participate in liability for the disease. 27 The above
disadvantages suggest that the Keene decision of continuous cov-
erage, although perhaps the most effective theory for insidious
disease claims, is still far from perfect.
A comparison of the injurious exposure, continuous trigger and
manifestation theories indicates the source of confusion in the in-
surance and manufacturing industries. No one is exactly sure of
which liability theory to rely on for future predictions. There is
simply no uniform standard of liability for predictability, financial
stability, and security.
121. For example, many of the federal laws mandating accurate employment
records such as Occupational, Health & Safety Acts were not in force until the late
1960's. Thus, employers either did not or could not keep precise data concerning
starting dates, firing, retirement, and employment periods. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION AND WELFARE REPORT (June 1981).
122. See supra note 15.
123. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
125. 667 F.2d at 1047.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1058 (Wald, J., concurring).
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERGENT LIABILITY THEORIES
Judicial imposition of the manifestation, injurious exposure and
continuous trigger theories has resulted in severe and unexpected
consequences to both the insurance and manufacturing indus-
tries. Thus far, judicial imposition of liability has been without re-
gard for the future solvency of the participants.
A prime example of the panic within the asbestos community is
the Johns-Manville case. As a manufacturer of asbestos and as-
bestos-related products, Johns-Manville had been named, as of
January of 1981, in over 16,000 asbestos lawsuits.128 Coopers &
Lybrand, the accounting firm for Johns-Manville Corporation,
qualified the company's 1980 and 1981 financial reports because of
doubts about the impact of asbestos litigation. 129 By August of
1982, over 2,500 new claims had been filed, and the company had
tentatively settled millions of dollars of previous claims. Legal
costs in defense of other claims were mounting, as the company
held back payment of its judgments, hoping for new liability rul-
ings by the various circuits to aid their situation. Finally, in the
fall of 1982, Johns-Manville fied a petition for protection under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.130 Both the insurance and
manufacturing industries have taken great interest in the action
of Johns-Manville. Listed among its liabilities were not only the
amount of judgments and settlements rendered against the com-
pany, but also an estimated sum representing what amounts
could become due in subsequent bad faith litigation.
The good faith aspect of claims settlement is of major concern
to insurers involved with insidious disease actions. Not only are
the actions being concluded with large sums being awarded, but
the original claimants are filing bad faith actions when companies
drag their feet in payment.'31 The alternate theories of liability
have a great impact on this phenomena as the courts are split on
which theory to adopt, and companies attempt to use this confu-
sion to their advantage. In fact, the gravest concern in the bad
128. New York Times, August 27, 1982, § A at 1, col. 6. See also Comment, The
Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of Judicial Process?, 11 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 151 (1983).
129. Legal Times, March 30, 1982 at 1.
130. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 1982, at 1, col.2.
131. An adjudication of bad faith in claims settlement makes the insurer liable
for treble damages. In fact, one state court has already granted an asbestos claim-
ant the augmented damage award because his insurer did not settle in good faith.
See Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos, 105 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 435 N.E.2d 226 (1982).
faith litigation is the fact that it may subject the company to
treble punitive damages on top of the judgment already owing.
For example, a trial court in Indiana132 recently awarded punitive
damages to the plaintiff for lack of good faith by the manufacturer
in settlement and payment of an asbestos claim. Meanwhile, the
Supreme Court continues to refuse to grant certiorari for an insid-
ious disease action.
At this point, it is not unlikely that other manufacturers will fol-
low Johns-Manville into the bankruptcy court. If Johns-Manville
is permitted to reorganize and possibly reduce or be absolved of
its payment or settlement amounts, this will set a major prece-
dent for the industry. Manufacturers may be encouraged to fol-
low suit to avoid the financial burdens of litigation. This would
serve to frustrate injured plaintiffs in their search for relief and
would place an even heavier burden on non-filing insurers who
will become ultimately liable for the claims.
The alternate theories of liability have made it almost impossi-
ble for insurance companies to estimate their reserves and the
necessary premium charges to ensure adequate liquidity to pay
the claims as they become due.133 Also, with the judiciary's use
of alternate theories, it has become difficult to establish a precise
contribution formula. The continuous trigger theory does not
mandate contribution from the manufacturer, 3 4 whereas the
manifestation and injurious exposure theories impose contribu-
tion liability on the manufacturer for uninsured periods. Thus, for
almost every new decision by the circuit courts, a new mathemat-
ical calculation of contribution from co-defendants is required.
This lack of a uniform standard imposes severe time restraints on
an insurance company in calculating, contributing and paying
claims to avoid bad faith litigation.
With the Supreme Court thus far refusing to accept petitions on
the liability issue, another method must be propounded to settle
the insidious disease claims in a timely fashion. A proposed trust
fund theory of payment is being closely analyzed and even
adopted as a means to equitably solve the plethora of actions
against insurers and manufacturers.
132. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d 1212; Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod.
Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Proter v. Amer-
ican Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 682 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1007 (1982).
133. Insurance-Negligence and Compensation Law Proceedings, 68 A.B.A.J.
137 (1982).
134. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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V. THE PROPOSED TRUST FUND SOLUTION
With the vast number of cases filed and the staggering sums be-
ing awarded, this trend simply cannot continue. Of the over
30,000 asbestos related claims already concluded, the average
award has been $22,000 per claimant. 135 Clearly these liability
amounts are climbing faster than any insurance reserves or as-
sets can match and there simply is not enough to provide total
coverage for every claim. In order to avoid more actions like that
of Johns-Manville, a new and alternative system of proportioning
liability and establishing a trust fund for payments should be in-
voked by both insurers and manufacturers.
The trust fund concept was first introduced in asbestos claims
in a 1978 Texas Supreme Court decision 36 which established a
$20 million trust fund for 445 asbestos workers. The awards were
based on exposure time and relative severity of the disease. An-
other recent settlement established a $9.4 million fund for 680
workers exposed to asbestos prior to 1973.137 Establishment of
trust funds may be the best answer to the staggering liability
threatening the involved industries.138
A trust fund concept is capable of accomodating any theory of
liability. Although circuit courts may vary on the appropriate lia-
bility approach, a trust fund system would not only establish a
constant and predictable mechanism for both insurers and manu-
facturers, but would be capable of consistent application. By
adopting one formula for contribution purposes, using a sliding
scale for relevant time periods, a uniform and timely standard
could be utilized within each circuit. 39 A circuit following the in-
jurious exposure theory, for example, would merely calculate the
number of manufacturers and insurers involved during exposure
periods and the applicable number of years as an insurer or unin-
sured manufacturer. The total expected dollar amount of claims
would then be apportioned among the insurers and manufactur-
135. TASK FORCE REPORT ON ASBESTOS COMPENSATION, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR
(May 1981). That figure is the result of more than 30,000 claims which have been
settled.
136. Glover v. Johns-Mansville, 662 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1981).
137. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
138. See Asbestos Litigation: Common Sense or Common Disaster? 54 N.Y. ST.
B. J. 24 (1982).
139. Id. at 27.
ers who would contribute to the fund for the benefit of the
claimants.
An additional benefit of the trust fund concept is the certainty
afforded to both insurers and manufacturers in this otherwise un-
predictable area. By pledging contributions to the fund, insurers
would be able to more accurately predict their reserve require-
ments and liquidity positions. Manufacturers would have more
security and stability in their financial status and reporting of lia-
bility matters. Both industries would spend far less for both legal
defense costs and time expended in complex and repetitious
litigation.140
In order to utilize the trust fund approach, however, standards
of exposure and manifestation would have to be established. The
courts or some type of representative panel would have to man-
date a uniform method to ascertain exposure and manifestation
to trigger trust fund payments. This would entail sifting through
all of the medical evidence and tests to determine exactly what
would constitute exposure or manifestation. Once this finding
was made, however, it could be used as the basis of administering
a trust under any of the three liability theories.141
The use of a trust fund has been successfully employed in some
asbestos claims, 42 and can be equally applicable to other types of
insidious disease claims. A trust fund brings certainty to manu-
facturers and insurers, while providing plaintiffs with a fair and
timely disposition of claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
The insurance and manufacturing industries are threatened by
the increasing number of insidious disease claims being filed, as
well as the amounts at stake. Manufacturers and insurers have,
not surprisingly, disagreed over how to impose liability. The
courts have responded by developing three different theories of li-
ability imposition. The First Circuit has used a manifestation the-
ory imposing liability on the insurer from the date the disease
was discovered. The Sixth Circuit follows the injurious exposure
theory placing the duty to indemnify on the insurer from the time
of initial exposure. The D.C. Circuit has recently put forth the in
residence or continuous trigger approach where all insurers are
140. The average asbestos claim costs each defendant over $43,000 in legal fees
and takes approximately thirty-one months to conclude. ASBESTOS LIMGATION
REP., Update, Sept. 1982.
141. The first suggestion of using arbitrary standards for determining exposure
and/or manifestation was made by a dissenting judge in the INA case. 633 F.2d at
1231 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
142. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
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proportionately liable from the time of initial exposure until final
manifestation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has refused all
opportunities to resolve the three conflicting theories.
The consequences due to the lack of a uniform liability stan-
dard have been harsh. One major manufacturer has already filed
for protection from creditors and financial reorganization.143 In-
surance companies are. suffering from the inability to predict pre-
miums in order to pay out claims and still maintain financial
security. Furthermore, insurers are being subjected to bad faith
actions for failure to make prompt payment and have been
threatened with the possibility of treble punitive damages.
The trust fund system is the best answer to the dilemma. Once
basic evidentiary standards are decided, the trust fund can be
broadly applied to any theory of liability. Employment of a trust
fund would organize and equitably terminate insidious disease lit-
igation in a timely fashion for both claimant and insurer. A sys-
tematically applied trust fund would restore the predictability
necessary to ensure both reasonably stable insurance premiums
and adequate compensation to claimants.
SUSAN FRANKEWICH
143. Comment, The Manville Corporation Bankruptcy: An Abuse of Judicial
Process?, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 151 (1983).

